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Evaluating Complex Social Interventions in a Complex World 
David Byrne 
School of Applied Social Sciences: Durham University. 
The social world is complex and emergent. Nomothetic inquiry, directed towards establishing 
universal empirical regularities, cannot establish causality. We can never assign a causal 
effect to any intervention without assessing the whole context of that intervention. However, 
we can develop generalizable knowledge if we adopt research approaches which recognize 
both the implications of assigning causal powers to context – the essence of the realist take on 
evaluation, and the significance of human agency in relation to ‘the social type of causal 
nexus’. Useful literatures which can contribute to developing such knowledge include macro-
political science’s concern with the importance of temporal ordering in relation to outcomes, 
Ragin’s set theoretic understanding of causal relations and his development of systematic 
comparison as a basis for explicating those relations, and the presentation of causal narratives 
as foundation for process tracing. Every complex social intervention has to be considered as a 
case. Systematic comparison across cases allows us to generalize within limits but this still 
means we can transfer knowledge beyond the unique ideographically described instance. 
Whilst we can never establish universal / nomothetic accounts of causality, we can, through 
careful comparison and exploration of complex contingent causation, begin to get a handle on 
what works where (in what context), when (in what temporal context), and in what order. 
Introduction 
The view that the social world is composed of complex systems is now almost conventional. 
So for example the recent University College London / Lancet Commission investigating 
Shaping Cities for Health: complexity and the planning of the urban environment in the 21
st
 
Century (Rydin et al. 2012) laid out its frame of reference unequivocally and identified the 
implications with equal force: 
‘The Commission began from the premise that cities are complex systems, with urban 
health outcomes dependent upon many interactions and feedback loops, so that prediction 
within the planning process is fraught with difficulties and unintended consequences are 
common.’ (Rydin et al. 2012 2079) 
The key characteristic of complex systems is emergence and there are few better definitions 
of the implications of emergence than the earliest use of the word in this context: 
‘Every resultant is either a sum or a difference of the co-operant forces; their sum when 
their directions are the same – their difference when the directions are contrary. Further, 
every resultant is clearly traceable in its components, because these are homogeneous and 
commensurable. It is otherwise with emergent, when, instead of adding measurable 
motion to measurable motion, or things of one kind to other individuals of their kind, 
there is a co-operation of things of unlike kinds. The emergent is unlike its components 
insofar as these are incommensurable and it cannot be reduced to their sum or their 
differences.’ (G.H. Lewes 1875 412) 
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The whole is greater than the sum of its parts but emergence implies more than simple 
holism: that we must understand things taken as a totality and only as a totality. And plainly a 
recognition of emergence means that we cannot understand things in terms of their 
components, the essence of the reductionist approach which underpins positivist science. 
Instead we have to think about parts and wholes and we must recognize that causality does 
not run in any one direction. So parts have causal implications for the whole, interactions 
among parts have causal implications for the whole, parts have causal implications for each 
other, and the whole has causal implications for parts.
1
 What does this mean for evaluation 
research, a process defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as among other things: 
evaluations of social programmes aimed at discovering whether these programmes have 
worked or not?  Evaluation can be a matter of accounting for the unique – did this single 
programme work? – but generally it has the wider intention not just of seeing if something 
worked but of seeing why it worked – establishing causality – as a basis for transferring 
effective knowledge beyond that specific instance. Evaluation attempts to develop knowledge 
which is in some way generalizable. In simple systems we do this by identifying causal 
relationships in terms of laws – statements which can tell us what will happen if something is 
done in relation to a system given the original state of that system. The classic form of such 
laws is expressed in Newton’s laws of motion. The assumption is that we can establish 
causality in terms which hold everywhere and always – the nomothetic programme.  
Note that laws in the Newtonian sense are inherently deterministic. If that then this, which is 
radically different from the establishment of a probabilistic relationship which says if this 
then that in a proportion of possible instances of that. Laws of a Newtonian form are 
applicable to all systems of a given kind. Probabilistic science establishes what will happen in 
proportionate terms across a large number of systems but can never tell us what will happen 
in a unique single system drawn from that large numbers of systems. So a meta-analysis of 
well conducted Randomized Controlled Trials of a drug in relation to a clinical condition will 
tell a physician about the proportion of cases with that condition for which the drug is 
effective BUT cannot tell the physician whether the drug will work on the patient sitting in a 
given consultation in relation to the condition. This is the dilemma identified by Griffiths et 
al. (2010) in a piece entitle: How to tailor medical interventions for the individual patient.  It 
was precisely this distinction between regularities of relationship established by controlled 
experiment on single cases but repeated consistently across other single cases – bench 
science, and probabilistic relationships established statistically across multiple cases which 
led Znaniecki (1931) to turn towards qualitative analytic induction as the mode for 
establishing causation in the social world. 
Emergence makes things even more difficult. We should in fact recognize incomplete 
probabilistic causal explanations as indicative of emergence. The cases which do not fit the 
incomplete causal account have something else going on – the drug which works for one 
patient does not work for another because the complex systems represented by the patients 
differ in some important respect. The Baysian programme of incremental improvement in 
probabilistic predictive power by the attachment of additional conditional probabilities 
represents a kind of acknowledgement of this, as does the setting of interaction terms in linear 
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modelling processes. So we cannot assert that we can find out what works for changing 
complex systems. Instead we have to ask: 
• What has worked? 
• How has it worked? 
 Which is to ask: What causal mechanisms have operated? 
• Where has it worked? 
• When has it worked? 
• Can it work elsewhere? 
• Can it work elsewhen? 
 
What is about specification of the nature of intervention. Where and when are about context. 
Elsewhere and elsewhen are about transferability.  Answers to all those questions depend on 
answering how – on the establishment of causal mechanism. Note that in complex systems 
the cause will seldom be the intervention – something done to the system – taken alone. What 
matters is how the intervention works in relation to all existing components of the system and 
to other systems and their sub-systems which intersect with the system of interest. The 
mechanism will be complex. Indeed we should stop talking about the mechanism, 
mechanisms in the singular. The notion of a single way in which outcomes can be generated 
has to be abandoned because we must recognize as the rather strange English expression puts 
it, there is more than one way to skin a cat.
2
 When we intervene in multiple complex systems 
then we have to recognize that the same outcome may be generated in more than one way. So 
we have to find methods of identifying causal mechanisms, methods that can cope not only 
with complex causation, but also with multiple causation.  
There is another crucial characteristic of complex systems which matters in relation to 
evaluation. Complex systems have a history and that history has a direction towards their 
current state and reaching forward into the future. For complex systems time has an arrow. 
The best way to develop an understanding of the implications of this is by using the idea of a 
state space to describe all possible states of the complex system. The state space is the multi-
dimensional mathematical space where the number of dimensions is the number of 
quantitative descriptors of the condition of the system and the location of a given system in 
that state space is indicated by the values of those descriptors. In a two dimensional state 
space this would be at a  point, in a three dimensional one across a plane, and so on for higher 
dimensions where the number of descriptors is greater than three. We can think of the state 
space as being a possibility space in the sense that it contains all possible conditions of the 
system given the possible values of the descriptors. However, complex systems do not have 
access to all these possible conditions. Instead they have access only to a more limited set of 
possible future states and one key determinant of the character of that set is their history. This 
is the essence of the idea of path dependency. Note that the set of possible future states for 
the system given its current state is not one but multiple and that set of course includes 
staying much the same, that is undergoing no qualitative change of kind. The objective of 
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interventions is to change the state of the system, to modify its trajectory through time so that 
in the future it is different from what it is now.  However, the set of futures is path dependent 
limited, note not determined in the sense of single but determined in the other sense of the 
word which means bounded within a range.  
The implications of complexity for evaluation have been explored rather well by Sanderson 
(2000), Barnes et al. (2003) and Callaghan (2008). All write in a way which is congruent with  
the tradition of complex realism developed by Reed and Harvey (1992). So there is a 
substantial degree of overlap between the issues which emerge from a complexity take on 
evaluation and both the programme of realist evaluation which began with Pawson and Tilley 
(1997) and the approach of ‘Theories of Change’ (see Mason and Barnes 2007).3 Here we 
find an explicit concern with the key themes of social theory, that is the significance of social 
structure and the potential of human agency.  
Pawson puts it like this: 
‘ … a critical feature of all programmes is that, as they are delivered, they are embedded 
in social systems. It is through the workings of entire systems of social relationships that 
any changes in behaviours, events and social conditions are effected.’ (2006 30) 
Another way to express this is to say that social structure matters. Callaghan develops this 
idea very fruitfully in relation to the idea of ‘negotiated order’: 
‘The notion of negotiated order is premised in understanding of how systems are not only 
structural entities, but are also fundamentally shaped in the context of the forces and 
conditions pertaining at the ‘bottom’ of the hierarchy, being created and recreated by the 
actors located there. Straus et al. (1933) developed the concept from fieldwork in 
organizations in response to the clash between the perspectives of Parsons (primacy of 
order) and Dewey (primacy of change). Strauss argued that within organizations order is 
negotiated and that this is an ongoing production of the actors involved. Organizational 
relations, therefore, although having a structural quality, are the product of this continued 
process of making and remaking. The existence of structure is important in setting the 
positions from which individuals negotiate and, in turn, which gives these negotiations 
their patterned quality, but these products are historical and temporally shaped, always 
open to review and revision. The order that is produced is best described as negotiated 
because it relies on the daily decisions of actors within this context. … In negotiated order 
we can understand the structures as created but also as creating the context for action.’ 
(2008 45) 
We can extend this, as Callaghan herself does, beyond the level of the organization to that of 
the social order as a whole. Note however that Callaghan brings agency to the fore, agency in 
the context of structure but also agency as constitutive of structure.  
Let us return to the issue of evaluation. We can evaluate simple interventions simply by 
RCTs, although note that the failure of any but the most dramatically effective 
pharmaceutical interventions to achieve full coverage in effectiveness raises very important 
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issues even here. However, when it comes to complex social interventions things are very 
different. This should be glaringly obvious when we deal with interventions which develop 
over time, involve lots of actors negotiating not only the contextual social order but also as 
Pawson reminds us the very process of evaluation itself. (2006 10), and are designed to 
achieve change at some systemic level.  Action research, and especially participatory action 
research, is not only about investigation of effectiveness. It is also about constitution of social 
orders anew. Even when dealing with the evaluation of interventions intended to achieve 
effects at the level of the individual or at most the household, we have to consider the 
implications of emergence. Often these are constructed in the form of RCTs but in reality 
there is very little useful evidence generated from them when considered in that mode 
precisely because the actual trajectory of the individuals in treatment and control groups is so 
profoundly affected by past history, present context, and the inter-relationship of the 
individuals considered as complex systems with other complex systems, which systems exist 
at every level up to an including the nature of the global economy.  
And, we have to consider agency. Cicourel annotating McIver put it like this: 
‘ … the social structure is for the most part created …. Unlike the physical nexus [the 
social type of causal nexus] does not exist apart from the motives of social beings [and 
requires a methodological strategy that fits the distinctiveness of social events.’ (Cicourel 
1964 1 quoting and annotating McIver 1942). 
Here we find Callaghan’s (2008) insistence on agency translated into a methodological 
specification for the exploration of cause. McIver asserts a distinctive ontology for the social, 
an ontology which has underpinned all assertions of the distinctiveness  of the human 
sciences since Vico. It is important to recognize that the endorsement of what amounts to an 
ontology which takes account of agency did not lead McIver to abandon the notion of cause. 
In contrast to Dilthey and Wildelband he did not confine the role of social science to the 
ideographic establishment of meaning through interpretation – the exposition of systems of 
meaning in the unique and specific case. Max Weber notoriously asserted that for social 
explanations to be satisfactory they had to satisfactory at the levels of both cause and 
meaning. In answering how questions we have to address causality but in so doing we have to 
recognize that human agency informed by meaning is absolutely part of our causal nexus. 
However, once we recognize that, then we are faced with the problem that methods devised 
for systems which are both simple and not permeated by purposeful human agency do not 
work for understanding complex social cause. 
Is there a way out of this dilemma? Yes, if we start to think about what we mean when 
describe social entities as cases and explore the potential of styles of social research which 
are case based and congruent with the complexity frame of reference.  
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Cases considered as complex systems 
Let us establish what we mean by cases, that is present a summary of answers to the question 
posed by the title of Ragin and Becker’s book What is a Case? (1992) Abbott’s answer in 
that book works well for our purposes: 
‘The move from population/analytic approach to case/narrative approach is thus a move 
first to a new way of regarding cases – as fuzzy realities with autonomously defined 
complex properties – and a move second to seeing cases as engaged in perpetual dialogue 
with their environment, a dialogue of action and constraint that we call plot.’ (1992 65) 
How can we answer our how question when we are dealing with cases? We need to begin 
with difference. McIver pointed us towards a fundamental when he asserted: 
‘the search for causes is directed to the differences between things… Underneath all our 
questioning lies the implicit acceptance of the axiom that no difference exists without a 
cause’.  (1942 27-28) 
Cilliers makes the same point in relation to understanding complex systems more generally.  
‘The point to be emphasized is that an abundance of difference is not a convenience, it is 
a necessity. Complex systems cannot be what they are without it, and we cannot 
understand them without the making of profuse distinctions. Since the interactions in such 
systems are non-linear their complexity cannot be reduced. The removal of relationships, 
i.e. the reduction of difference in the system will distort our understanding of such 
systems. A failure to acknowledge this leads to error, an error which is not only technical, 
but also ethical.’ (2010 8) 
To establish difference we need to compare and to compare in a systematic fashion. There is 
a method designed to do exactly that, Ragin’s Qualitative Comparative Analysis (1987) and 
that is one of the approaches which will be asserted as appropriate here. Implicit in Ragin’s 
approach is the idea that the end states, the ‘effects’ of complex causation in complex systems 
(see Byrne 2012), are the results of processes which have led to the systems being in a given 
state. This notion corresponds well to the general objectives of complex social interventions. 
‘ …  policy researchers, especially those concerned with social as opposed to economic 
policy, are often more interested in different kinds of cases and their different fates than 
they are  in the extent of the net causal effect of a variable across a large encompassing 
population of observations. After all, a common goal of social policy is to make decisive 
interventions, not to move average levels or rates up or down by some miniscule fraction.’ 
(Rihoux and Ragin 2004 18) 
 Ragin’s original interest was in macro-social historical development, in dealing with 
questions of the order of why did some nations in the first half of the twentieth century 
become dictatorships rather than democracies or why advanced industrial societies developed 
welfare states of different forms. We can see the outcome here being a state and the 
foundation of the attempt to establish causation in relation to a state being systematic 
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qualitative – hence qualitative – across cases  - hence comparative – with a view to 
identifying causal complexes – hence analysis although the usual reductionist logic of that 
terms is only partially pursued in Ragin’s approach.   
We need to return to the idea of process. Castellani and Hafferty (2009) have correctly 
asserted that given the dynamic natures of complex systems we must pay attention to 
processes as ongoing whilst recognizing that complex systems have relatively stable states for 
long periods. Such states are not static but rather describe periods in the trajectories of the 
system where they move in state space but move only within a relatively restricted area of the 
state space and do not move to a degree where quantity becomes transformed into quality and 
they therefore change kind.  There is a method which systematizes exploration of process 
across time – process tracing as proposed by George and Bennett precisely to address the 
relationship between case studies and theory building in the social sciences: 
‘… it was necessary to devise a case study methodology to analyze past instances of each 
of these generic problems to identify conditions and procedures that were associated with 
successful or failed outcomes. The challenge was to find ways of doing comparative 
analysis of a number of instances of each generic problem in ways that would draw 
analytical explanations of each case into a broader more complex theory, one that would 
discourage reliance on a single historical analogy.  …. For this purpose, George adapted 
methods of historical explanation to convert descriptive explanations of case outcomes 
into analytic explanations comprised of variables. This procedure made use of an 
inductive approach for theory-building, but it was analytic induction not raw empiricism. 
… In Harry Eckstein’s terminology, an ideographic atheoretical explanation was 
converted into a “disciplined configurative” study.’ (2005 x-xi) 
We will not accept ‘analytic explanations comprised of variables’ but the underlying logic of 
this approach in terms of analytic induction fits our needs. 
There is three further ingredients to add to the mix here. First, there is Byrne’s identification 
of cases as complex systems (2011) drawing on a synthesis of complexity and case based 
reasoning and explicitly endorsed by Ragin (2011). This amounts to a fuller development of 
the position expressed by Abbott (1992 65 see above) drawing on the language of complexity 
science and discussion of the nature of complex systems. Second, there is attention to what 
Ragin (1992) identified as the problem of casing in terms essentially synonymous with 
Cillier’s discussion of the specification for purposes of science of the boundaries of complex 
systems (2001). Third there is the value of explicit categorization both of cases as wholes and 
of subsystems of cases using available data describing subsets of what Byrne (2002) calls 
quantitative traces of the trajectories of complex systems. The purpose of this latter is to 
identify sub-systems of complex systems, which is both important in itself and facilitates the 
use of the quantitative element in QCA, the establishment of truth tables of configurations in 
relation to outcomes.  
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The term configuration in this sense is Ragin’s (1987) and it is revolutionary in its content. 
Ragin was explicitly rejecting variable based accounts of social relation in favour of what he 
calls ‘set theoretic’ understanding: 
‘ … case oriented research is not a primitive form of variable-oriented research that can 
be improved through stricter adherence to variable oriented standards. Rather, the case- 
oriented approach is better understood as a different mode of inquiry with different 
operating assumptions.’ (2004 12) 
‘For causation, the main contrast is between the conventional view of causation as a 
contest between individual variables to explain variation in an outcome and the diversity-
oriented view that causation is both conjunctural and multiple. In the conventional view, 
each single causal condition, conceived as an analytically distinct variable, has an 
independent impact on the outcome. In the diversity-oriented view, causes combine in 
different and sometimes contradictory ways to produce the same outcome, revealing 
different paths.’ (2000 15) 
Configurations, represented by lines in a truth table in the simplest form of QCA where 
attributes are assigned to cases as binaries i.e. present or absent, can be understood as 
assemblages. These are complexes, not variables, and there is an explicit rejection of the 
notion that it is meaningful to assign partial causal powers to any element in the 
configuration. The following refers explicitly to the use of QCA in exploring organizations 
but has general applicability.  
‘What emerges, then, is a picture of configurations as embedded in space and time and 
involving varying levels of complexity, dynamism and analysis.  Simple configurations 
may involve only a few and linear interdependencies. In contrast, complex configurations 
may involve multiple interdependencies that are furthermore characterized by interactions 
such as complementarity or substitution effects leading to synergies and trade-offs 
between the different elements. Furthermore, configurations need not be static, but may 
be dynamically changing, suggesting that organizations follow dynamic constellations 
that change over their life cycles. … Finally, configurations may be cutting across several 
levels of analysis. For example, organizational configurations may involve elements at the 
organizational, intra-organizational, and supra-organizational level.’ (Fiss 2009 429-30) 
Configurations represent difference both in relation to cause and in relation to effects, 
understood here as outcome states. If we take the simplest and commonest form of QCA it 
establishes configurations which show patterns of sets of binary attributes of cases in relation 
to outcomes also defined in binary terms as present or absent. In this form the truth table is a 
slice through a multi-dimensional contingency table with each configuration being a set of 
cells arranged against an outcome.
4
 The truth table is simply a two dimensional 
representation of this table with the number of cases recorded as it would be in the outcome 
set of cells in the table. So the truth table allows us to see all the configurations possible 
given the set of attributes deployed, those configurations which have cases with that set of 
attributes, the number of such cases, and the proportion of those cases which have the 
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outcome condition state specified. QCA allows for a reduction in configuration elements 
using De Morgan’s law and Boolean logic but it is not necessary to proceed to that stage. We 
can use the method in an exploratory rather than explanatory mode. This is particularly useful 
when we have ‘contradictory’ configurations i.e. configurations without 100% of the cases 
having the same outcome state. We can then return to the cases in such instances and seek for 
the additional differentiating characteristics of their previous trajectories and contexts which 
might help us to resolve the contradiction i.e. generate an explanation of the difference in 
observed outcome state.
5
 
This discussion of the nature of truth tables identifies another radical distinction between the 
kind of methods which are compatible with an understanding of the social and interventions 
in the social which are complexity compatible. Traditional quantitative approaches have 
overwhelmingly preferred measurements which are scalar i.e. possess the full arithmetical 
properties of real numbers. In terms of levels of measurement they are continuous. However, 
QCA’s set theoretic approach deals primarily with measurement at the nominal level, that is 
with measurement simply used to specify difference in terms of set membership. There is a 
scalar component to fuzzy set QCA although in practice only at an ordinal level. Fuzzy set 
approaches are first nominal. That is they specify set membership. Then in QCA they become 
ordinal by specifying ranked degree of membership of the set between total non membership 
indicated by 0 and total membership indicated by 1. This can be useful but it is the nominal 
specification which matters. A complexity take on attribute specification in a QCA truth table 
regards each attribute as a specification of a sub-system with causal potential, that is as an 
element in the system which in interaction with other elements has causal powers. This raises 
a practical issue. Conventional statistical techniques can cope with large numbers of variate 
entities although they do, particularly in relation to data sets derived from samples, have to 
address issues of multicollinearity in terms of assigning causal power to individual predictors 
in a model. QCA in its simplest form, that is when it works with bivariate attributes, 
generates 2
n
 configurations when we have n attributes. Many of the configurations thus 
generated will have no cases associated with them. This is not a problem because such 
configurations can in complexity terms be considered as describing empty attractor states in 
the possibility space. The probability of such empty attractor states is high and their existence 
is inherent in a complexity framed understanding of the nature of reality.  However, we still 
are likely to have very large numbers of occupied attractor states –configurations - when we 
use large numbers of attributes in the generation of truth tables. 
The practical way to resolve this is to use some data reduction device to reduce the number of 
attributes we deploy in generating the truth table. Two approaches are possible here. One is to 
use some variant of factor analysis and use the generated factors instead of the attributes 
although factor analysis is a continuous data technique and produces continuous scores rather 
than nominal specification of attribute value as an indicator of set membership. Another 
which is both much more straightforward in practice and conceptually more in tune with a 
complex systems understanding is to use cluster analysis across sub-sets of the measurements 
for the cases used in the analysis. This allows for the incorporation into the analysis of 
variates measured at any level. The key issue is careful specification of the sub-set of variates 
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used to construct clusters. This must be justified on grounds which specify those variates as 
traces of a sub-system in the overall causal process. See Blackman et al.(2011) for an 
example of this approach. Sorting things into kinds, the outcome of any numerical typology 
method, can also be used in relation to outcomes. This approach can be particularly useful 
when in addition to attributes generated by careful historical process tracing, we have 
available attribute data of a conventional statistical kind which is particularly the case when 
we have large geographical data sets or data sets describing sets of institutions – schools, 
hospitals, public health systems and so on.  
If we set configurations into complexity terms then we can see cases with the same ‘causal 
attribute set’ (configuration) as being in the same location in the multi-dimensional 
possibility (space) state. The cases can be thought of as ensembles i.e. sets of systems rather 
than single systems and those with the same causal configuration can be thought of as near 
neighbours. This term is extremely valuable since it allows us to bring in similarity, including 
similarity derived from path dependencies, in exploring possible futures. This matters since 
when asking what works when and where we need to find answers which work for cases of 
particular kinds. Consider success in achieving good cohort outcomes measured by 
examination success for secondary schools. Selective schools do well because they select. 
Schools with children who are affluent and do not have special needs
6
 mostly do well. 
Schools with more deprived intakes of children and with more children with special needs 
mostly do not so well. When we find a factor differentiating such schools so that some do 
well, then that is of value to other schools of the same kind. They cannot make their children 
affluent. They can introduce what was identified here, a specialist intensive mentoring 
system. It might work for them. So in general in this logic of inquiry we proceed by 
systematic consideration of the relationships of differences to outcomes. 
The emphasis on process should remind us of the significance of temporal order in complex 
causation: ‘When things happen within a sequence affects how they happen.’ Charles Tilly 
(1984 14) Whilst much of the work influenced by Tilly’s dictat has turned to conventional 
statistical methods which incorporate attention to time and order, those approaches do not 
adequately address the issues of complex and multiple causation. Establishment of temporal 
order is a necessary part of process tracing and there has been an extensive discussion in the 
QCA literature of the possibility of including a temporal dimension in the framing of 
configurations: see Caren and Panofsky (2005) and Ragin and Strand (2008). The key point is 
that set theoretic approaches can take account of temporal ordering. 
One final practical tip is in order. Often in evaluation we work with sets of texts, usually 
literal texts in the form of documents, transcripts of interviews / focus groups, field notes etc. 
although increasingly we might use other documentary forms including images, sound 
recordings pre transcription and so on. The widely used qualitative data management package 
NVIVO has a facility which allows specification of case as well as thematic nodes. Thematic 
nodes are conceptually associated with a grounded theory approach to interpretation. Case 
nodes contain all material associated with the case. NVIVO allows entry of attribute values 
for cases and the construction of a data spread sheet with the values of these attributes for 
every case. Although the guidance material for the package and literature discussing its use 
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generally indicates that attributes of cases will primarily be existing measurements on the 
cases, we can actually identify new attributes during the qualitative interpretative phase of the 
work and then specify values for these attributes for each case as a case node. The attribute 
table spread sheet can then be exported and used as input into QCA. In other word NVIVO 
provides a useful platform for the development of the comparative phase of qualitative 
comparative analysis. This development is necessarily a development towards specification 
of attributes and thereby moves towards quantitative work. It can be  used in conjunction with 
a QCA which begins with a data set describing a large number of cases  when that QCA is 
deployed in exploratory mode. So when we have contradictory configurations we can 
assemble qualitative information about the cases associated with that configuration and 
construct new attributes to try to arrive at a causal account of distinction in that configuration. 
This can often be done for formal institutions on the basis of inspection reports. 
Conclusion 
Let us be clear about the position advanced in this piece. If we understand the social world as 
composed of intersecting complex systems with causal powers running in all directions 
across and within those systems, not only does this have implications for the methods which 
can establish causality in useful ways (see Byrne and Uprichard 2012) but it also disallows 
other approaches. In particular it denies the value of Randomized Controlled Trials, 
particularly in relation to complex social interventions. The RCT is premised on the notion 
that a single intervention of a particular kind can yield useful information on the basis of 
comparisons between sets of cases randomly allocated to treatment and control groups with 
interventions and outcomes being very clearly defined from the outset. Complex social 
interventions which involve complex actions over time by humans with agency can never 
accord with this protocol. Nor should they! Let along the practical difficulties – the numbers 
of cases are too small for valid statistical inference, it is impossible to control the actions of  
human agents in the context, designs cannot cope with any but the most straightforward of 
first order statistical interactions and can only do so with very tight experimental controls -
once we understand the social world as complex then we must recognize that methods 
organized around simplicity have very limited – not none but very limited – value and then 
only in very special circumstances. We have to recognize that even in contexts where the 
RCT, or rather the meta-analysis of large numbers of RCTs, has been promoted as the gold 
standard, this approach is now being challenged. The move towards data mining of health 
records in order to develop personalized medical interventions (see Castellani and Castellani 
2003) is a recognition of the significance of trajectories and path dependency even at the 
level of the complex system which is a single human being. For complex and chronic 
conditions, the major sources of human morbidity and of much human mortality, this 
approach works when RCTs are effectively useless. 
Most of the studies which have been conducted in accordance with the complexity frame of 
reference have been conducted in advanced developed societies but they have been conducted 
primarily in relation to health and other interventions in the poorest areas of those societies, 
in the territories which are sometimes described as ‘the fourth world’. The practices and 
techniques which have been developed in such interventions are immediately transferable to 
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what have been traditionally thought of as the development context. Indeed since many of 
these interventions have relied explicitly on participatory methods and co-production of 
knowledge, they have drawn themselves on development research experience as it is 
conventionally understood. And that is perhaps the  most important thing to say about 
complexity informed research in relation to development of any kind. The complexity frame 
of reference deployed through process tracing and systematic comparison across cases poses 
no problems for the evaluation of action research and other forms of participatory research. It 
can accommodate history and agency and that is just what is needed for the development of 
transferable knowledge from social interventions in a complex social world.  
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1
 For an elaborated discussion of this point see Byrne and Uprichard (2012) 
 
2
 I have never skinned a cat but have skinned rabbits and know only one way to do it! 
 
3
 See the useful counter posing of these two positions by Blamey and Mackenzie (2007) 
 
4
 A conventional variable approach would be logistic regression although models could be 
fitted in a less deterministic way using log-linear methods. However, both fit ‘the model’ as 
opposed to allowing for multiple causation and can only admit complex causation through 
rather clumsy fitting of interaction terms.  
 
5
 There are variants of QCA which allow for multiple values of attributes or for partial 
(fuzzy) assignation of cases to attribute sets. These are more complicated to run and interpret 
but the underlying logic is the same.   
 
6
 The data suggests that there is a threshold effect (tipping point) for proportion of children 
with special needs in an English secondary school. Below this threshold the proportion does 
not contribute to outcome. Above it there is an increasing negative effect. 
